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MEDIATOR ACCOUNTABILITY:
RESPONDING TO
FAIRNESS CONCERNS
Judith L. Maute"
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation and newer forms of dispute resolution provide much-needed
options to the traditional litigation forum. The adversary process is too contentious, expensive and time-consuming for many disputes. Nevertheless, some
thoughtful lawyers and legal scholars voice concern that mediation may cut short
legal developments on important issues of public concern and reinforce existing
power disparities between parties.' Traditional commitment to mediator neutrality
may undermine protection of parties' legal rights.
Not all mediation programs trigger these concerns. Some experienced
divorce mediators have set ground rules and refined the process to guard against
patently unfair agreements. These recognized techniques may serve as a guide for
other forms of mediation. In recent years leading lawyers and judges have
supported developing forms of dispute resolution. Funds are available for new
programs. Many new programs are being started, motivated by both an
entrepreneurial and public spirit. Unfortunately, enthusiasm for the idea is not
always translated into carefully devised screening of disputes and safeguards to
insure minimal societal fairness of the mediated agreement. My comments are
directed primarily at these programs.
Response to criticisms must occur at three levels: (1) to screen and identify
for special treatment mediable disputes that displace adjudication; (2) to expand
upon the mediator's accountability for outcome; and (3) to create a workable
system of public review. Evolving ethical standards should provide further
guidance for satisfying accountability in specific mediation contexts.

* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; Visiting Professor, Ohio State University College
of the Law; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1978; LLM., Yale, 1982. The author thanks Bea Moulton,
Len Riskin and Nancy Rogers who commented on drafts and shared generally unavailable research
materials. Jo Hartwick and Keith Quinton, University of Oklahoma (J.D. 1990), and Diane Weindorf,
Hastings (J.D. expected 1991) provided able research assistance.
1. See generally Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudicein AlternativeDisputeResolution, 1985 Wis. L REV. 1359 [hereinafter Delgado];
Edwards,AlternativeDisputeResolution: PanaceaorAnathema *, 99 HARv. L REV. 668 (1986); Fiss,
Against Settlemen 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Hazard & Scott, The Public Nature of Private
Adjudication, 6 YALE L & POL'Y REV. 42 (1988).
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According to theory, a mediator's accountability for fairness is limited to
process, not outcome.' Questions of accountability versus neutrality address
3
fairness in the abstract; greater focus should relate to specific contexts.
Accountability should vary with the nature of a dispute and circumstances of
mediation. For example, interpersonal and non-legal disputes handled through a
community mediation program may still fit the traditional model.
This Article focuses on mediation of disputes that would otherwise be
resolved through the legal system. Where a private settlement supplants public
adjudication, the mediator is accountable for a procedurally fair process and a
minimally fair substantive outcome. Procedural intervention to insure access to
relevant information and independent advice is consistent with neutrality. For
these cases, the neutrality principle must be modified to protect public values
jeopardized by the private settlement. As to substantive fairness, the probable
litigated outcome should serve as a reference point; the parties are free to find a
solution that better serves their personal values and concerns.4 The mediator,
however, should refuse to finalize an agreement where one party takes advantage
of the other, where the agreement is so unfair that it would be a miscarriage of
justice, or where the mediator believes it would not receive court approval.5
Completed agreements failing this standard should be vulnerable for a limited time
period to rescission on request of a party or during public review. If rescission
is not possible and the mediator failed to use appropriate safeguards to insure
minimal fairness, the disadvantaged party should have recourse against the
mediator for malpractice.
In evaluating a mediation program designed to handle disputes susceptible to
legal resolution, several levels of inquiry are in order. What disputes are suitable
for mediation, considering the parties and the public or private nature of the
conflict? Does the mediation process satisfy basic standards for procedural
fairness? Are there adequate safeguards to prevent a patently unfair result?
Part II articulates the traditional commitment to mediator neutrality, which
is criticized for subverting public values protected through formal adjudication.
Responsive to critics, Part III argues the need for public checking mechanisms for
mediation of disputes that would otherwise be handled through the courts. Three
mechanisms are suggested: preliminary screening, increased mediator accountability for both process and outcome, and finally, public review. Part III identifies
some specific criteria for evaluating whether a dispute is suitable for mediation.
This can help the bar decide what types of mediation programs to encourage and
help individual lawyers screen cases for referral to mediation. Increased mediator

2. N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A STUDENT's GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAw 146 (1987) (citing
Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 UTAH L REv. 85,
86-87 (1981)).
3. Coulson, Must Mediated Settlements Be Fair?, 1988 NEGOTIATION J. 15, 17.
4. Center for the Development of Mediation in Law, Training Materials 25, 37-38 (August 1983)
[hereinafter Training Materials] (copy on file with author).
5. Id. at 25.
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accountability raises many complex issues. During the mediation, the mediator
must intervene to avoid patently unfair agreements. Accepted mediation
techniques can protect both mediator neutrality and public values of fairness.
Accountability for fairness relates to all mediators, but raises quite different ethical
issues for lawyer and lay mediators. During a final, public review process,
mediated agreements should be evaluated against minimal standards of fairness to
protect both the immediate parties and the public interest.
II. MEDIATOR NEUTRALITY VS. ACCOUNTABILITY
Effectiveness of a dispute resolution process is tested by whether it is
inexpensive, prompt, procedurally fair and results in final, optimal solutions that
satisfy the parties.6 Mediation is negotiation facilitated by a neutral third party
who assists the participants in arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement.7
Conventional thinking maintains that mediator neutrality is "absolutely essential"
to building the trust needed for the process to work.'
Classic neutrality
maintains that the mediator is both impartial and uncommitted as to outcome.
Assured of neutrality, the parties confide their real concerns to the mediator who
can help clarify their values, identify the potential zone of agreement, and
orchestrate the negotiation to successful conclusion."
Theoretically, mediator accountability is satisfied by ensuring a procedurally
fair process that treats parties with dignity and respect and stops intimidating or
abusive behavior. The mediator is responsible for assuring access to relevant
factual and legal information.W° Substantively, absent abuse of the mediation
process, any settlement agreed to by the parties is deemed fair. Voluntary
compliance is more likely when parties reach their own agreement. Even though
settlement may not be the most desirable outcome, the settlement decision rests
with the parties. The mediator is responsible to insure that parties "understand
their choice and to explore with them their enlightened self-interest, but not to
impose [one's] values on them."" Coercing the parties into an agreement the
mediator deems fair is an unacceptable response to issues of power imbalance.

6. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1985) [hereinafter DISPUTE
RESOLUTION].
7. Id. at 8.
8. J. FOLBERO & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFuCTS
WITHOUr LITIGATION 244-50, 260-63, 349-54 (1984); DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 108-13;
N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 137; Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A
Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L REv. 85, 91-97 (1981).
9. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 91.
10. N. ROGERS AND R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 137; see, e.g., ETI1CAL STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY (Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 1986) reprinted in N.
ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 263-267; MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND
DIVORCE MEDIATION (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts 1984); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES (1984).
11. Patton, A Brief Outline of the Mediation Process (Jan. 14, 1982) (unpublished paper) (copy
on file with author).
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Instead,2 the ultimate recourse is refusal to sign and file an agreement with the
1

court.

Opinions are split on the question and extent of mediator accountability. The
issues are whether, when and what intervention is proper to avoid a patently unfair
agreement.
Initially, the problem is definitional. Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder.
Fair compared to what? To the probable adjudicated outcome? What makes that
the best result for these parties? After all, courts have limited ability to order
relief and secure compliance. Aversion to enforcement difficulties encourages
judges to issue technical orders in absolute terms. Dictating fair outcome as
defined by the probable result ignores all the costs, traumas and uncertainties of
litigation. Where parties understand a predictable outcome they have likely
bargained "in the shadow of the law," with deviations reflecting individualized
negotiation about unique concerns.13 The parties are best able to reach an
agreement which maximizes their individual preferences. Indeed, the accommodation of nonlegal principles is a'prime advantage of private settlement that makes
the outcome more acceptable and enduring.14 Moreover, the amorphous fairness
standard is almost meaningless for the many disputes suitable for mediation
involving stakes too small or personal to litigate.
These arguments fall short of the mark. They cannot sustain criticism that
public values may be subverted by private settlement. Private justice is also
public justice. 5 Settlement cuts off any public airing of claims, including those
implicating public values that may need authoritative resolution. A private truce
can be bought to keep secret information the public needs to know. Formality in
litigation exerts control over prejudicial bias and may equalize power disparities.1" It aims for a fair trial and outcome. Public justice transcends the
immediate parties; decision rests with an impartial decisionmaker using societal
standards.' 7 The decision is subject to public scrutiny on appeal and by
commentators. Private settlement prevents these safeguards from operating.
III. PUBLIC CHECKS ON PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE NEED FOR SCREENING,
INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC REVIEW
Mediation intercedes to facilitate an agreement the parties could not otherwise
reach on their own. It may substitute for public adjudication--often a desirable
and appropriate end. Nonetheless, checking mechanisms are needed to protect

12. Id. See also J. FOLBERO & A. TAYLOR, supra note 8; Stulberg, supra note 8, at 86-87.
13. See Cooter, Macks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
14. J. FOLBERO & A. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 246.
15. Fiss, supra note 1; Hazard & Scott, supra note 1.
16. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1368-75; See, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989)
(racially discriminatory exercise of preemptory challenges in civil case violate equal protection);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), modified, 895 F.2d 218 (1990).
17. Hazard & Scott, supra note 1, at 57.
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public values of fairness and the need for authoritative, public resolution.
Protection of the latter value is foremost at the preliminary screening stage when
evaluating disputes suitable for private resolution. Screening can also protect for
fairness by excluding disputes where there are vast disparities in bargaining power
between the parties. Where mediation acts in place of adjudication, additional
safeguards are needed during and after the mediation. The mediator is properly
held to a higher standard of accountability. The process should enable both parties
to obtain relevant information about the law and how it might apply to the instant
facts. When disparities in power or knowledge disable a weaker party from
effective bargaining, the mediator must intervene to avoid a patently unfair
agreement at odds with the probable outcome of adjudication. Finally, these
mediated agreements should receive meaningful public review to confirm they are
within legal bounds and do not subvert important public values.
A. Screening for Mediation Suitability
Some mediation adherents maintain any dispute is mediable. Although the
process is widely adaptable, not all disputes should be mediated. Adequate
response to legitimate criticism demands careful screening of disputes suitable for
mediation. First, what are favorable conditions for successful mediation?
Professor Lon Fuller's insights assist this inquiry. Accounting for public values
of fairness and the need for authoritative determination, which disputes are good
candidates for mediation? What disputes are inappropriate for mediation because
they involve matters of public importance or require the formal protections of
adjudication?
A main objective of mediation, Fuller says, is to make parties aware of the
social norms applicable to the relationship, and to persuade them to accommodate
to the structure imposed by those norms."8 This assumes the applicable norms
are both known and discoverable. In practice, often norms are created through the
structured mediation process.' 9 A central quality of mediation is its "capacity to
re-orient [the] parties' relationship towards a new, shared perception based on
mutual respect, trust and understanding." 20 A heavily interdependent relationship

18. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL L REv. 305, 307-08 (1971). Others
subscribe to a more limited objective: simply to reach an agreement that is acceptable to the parties.
Although consistent with mediation theory of party autonomy, it ignores knowledge and power
differentials that, unaided, may distort outcome. By incorporating relevant social norms, the mediation
must address how the legal system might regard the dispute.
19. Id.
20. Fuller, supra note 18, at 325-26.
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between two persons exerts internal pressure for agreement; 2 mediation can
resolve bargaining impasses by reorienting the relationship.2
These ideas help identify suitable categories of disputes for mediation.
Where the law is settled and can be adequately explained to the parties, the
mediation can guide their efforts towards agreement that approximates or improves
upon articulated social norms. 23 By contrast, if the dispute involves important
unsettled questions of law, private mediation subverts the public values protected
through formal adjudication. Mediation is inappropriate for such cases. Consider,
for example, sexual harassment. Developing case law seeks to define limits of
institutional liability. The personal aspects and adverse publicity of such conflicts
could tempt efforts at private mediation. The unsettled state of public law,
combined with power imbalances that created the initial harassment opportunity,
renders mediation of such conflicts inappropriate. 24 Public disposition through
courts or administrative agencies better protects against power imbalances and
private prejudice. 2s

21. Id. at 312. The model he suggests is based on collective bargaining, and envisions mediation
best suited to disputes (1) between only two parties (2) in a relationship of heavy interdependence
pressuring for an agreement (3) that will combine elements of economic trade with (4) elements of a
written constitution to govern future relations (5) negotiated by agents, not principals, and (6) the
employer occupies a dual role as director of an enterprise and coequal with union in negotiating and
administering the agreement. He anticipated some form of mediation in environmental disputes,
although more than two parties are necessarily involved. Id. at 334-37.
22. See also N. ROGERs & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 41-59 (providing working guidelines for
a lawyer to use in determining whether a client's dispute should be referred to mediation). The long
list of indications and contraindications primarily relate to the client's concerns, and not to issues of
fairness or the public interest in having an authoritative, public determination.
23. Law is a relevant reference point for the mediation. To ignore law would deprive the parties
of its value in helping them reach a fair agreement. Yet the law and predictions of how it would apply
to the instant facts need not bind the parties, excluding the parties from using their own sense of
fairness as a basis for decision. Law is a relevant indicator of what relief would be available in
litigation, an indicator of societal standards relevant to the dispute, and an expression of relevant
principles or values Which may aid the parties' own resolution of the issues. Training Materials, supra
note 4.
24. But see Riflkin, Mediation From a FeministPerspective: Promise and Problems, 2 J. LAW
& INEQUALITY 21, 29-30 (1984) (approving use of mediation in a university context where a student
claimed sexual harassment by a professor. The student was offered, and declined resort to an ad hoc
hearing procedure.) I disagree. The university's formal hearing procedure is important, both as a
precursor to the articulation of public values through formal adjudication, and in its own right. It
forces the hearing panel members to identify institutional values relating to harassment, which in turn
push for formal clarification of what conduct is unacceptable. With mediation a harassment problem
may stay hidden, risking recurrent incidents. The hearing procedure better serves academic institutional
values: it grabs the attention of the person against whom the complaint was made more effectively
than the informal, relatively friendly mediation process; it provides due process and fact-gathering
which protect against the professional taint arising from the allegations triggering the process; if the
allegations are substantiated, the outcome can provide meaningful remedies for the victim and
educational efforts extending beyond the immediate parties. Mediation may produce acceptable results
for the parties themselves, but the institutional interests in education and deterrence are lost.
25. See generally Delgado, supra note 1; Edwards, supra note 1.
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Where the internal affairs of a relationship are unsuited for a system of actoriented rules, mediation can help re-orient the relationship.2 For example,
nonviolent disputes in an ongoing marriage or between neighbors can badly disrupt
relationships. However, the conflict may be so personal or involve such small
stakes that the legal system cannot provide a satisfactory solution. Indeed, resort
to the law is likely to make things worse by solidifying positions and increasing
hostility levels. Mediation can help adjust the parties' perspectives on the
relationship to find an acceptable common ground for peaceful coexistence.
Polycentric disputes, involving complex and multifaceted problems, are also
inappropriate for adjudication. Through mediation the parties can create norms
that address the problems better than the awkward resolution possible with
adjudication based on act-oriented rules. For example, environmental disputes
involve competing claims of government regulators, advocacy groups, industry,
local community needs and affected property owners. Litigation could tie up a
project for years on procedural matters unrelated to its merits and impact on the
environment. Mediation involving all interested parties can enable a compromise
that addresses substantial issues eluded by protracted litigation.2
Essentially private disputes between parties of relatively equal power are
good candidates for mediation. 29 By definition, the private nature of the dispute
means there are no important public values that will be compromised or subverted
through private settlement. Inappropriate for private mediation are constitutional
claims, or those seeking authoritative statement on the respective obligations of the
government and its citizens. Public adjudication is needed "to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them. This
duty is not discharged when the parties settle."3 ° Some disputes appear private,
but raise important public concerns that could be subverted by purely private
settlement. For example, settlement of some products liability claims could
impede needed legal developments or suppress information of public health
threats." Economic incentives may pressure for generous private settlement to
avoid risk of adverse precedent or negative publicity. A claimant may stand to
receive excessive gain at the expense of the public interest and non-party third
persons. These cases are suitable for mediation only if an adequate checking
mechanism were in place.

26. Fuller, supra note 18, at 330-31.
27. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L REv. 353, 394-404 (1978).

28. Edwards, supra note 1, at 678; Fuller, supra note 18, at 334-37. See generally V. Huser,
Presentation at University of Oklahoma Law Center (Jan. 30, 1986) (describing environmental
mediation process and success stories) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author).
29. See generally Delgado, supra note 1, at 1367; Edwards, supra note 1, at 676; Fuller, supra
note 18, at 312.
30. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1085; See also supra note 24 (discussing explication of institutional
values through the formal hearing process of sexual harassment claims in a university setting).
31. Edwards, supra note 1, at 671-72.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1990, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1990, No. 2

Relative parity in bargaining power largely avoids the public concern for fair
resolution of essentially private disputes. 32 Mediating conflicts between a person
or institution of low power or status and one of much higher status or power risks
an agreement dictated by the stronger party.-- Compromise is an equitable
solution only between equals; between unequals, it "inevitably produces
inequality."3 In screening out unsuitable disputes for mediation, doubts should
be resolved against those involving significant power disparities. Mediation is no
haven for the poor or powerless.35 Stripped of adjudication's formal protections,
the private context leaves the weaker party vulnerable to prejudices and coercion.
The outcome may reflect more the stronger party's choice than mutual understanding and good faith compromise.' The private setting is likely to reinforce the
imbalance at the loss of court protection for the weaker party.
The mediator must assess whether the parties are suitable for mediation. Are
they capable of dealing fairly with each other? This inquiry has two components:
(1) Is each party abie to stand up for its own interest? (2) Is each party open to
reaching a result that is fair to the other? Several factors go into this determination. Each person should participate voluntarily, not coerced to mediate. The
parties must be able to communicate with each other, including both selfexpression and the capacity to hear the other. The emotional charge between them
must not be so intense that it disables one or both. Each person should be able
to identify and assert what is personally important as a solid and realistic basis for
choice-making. Each should be able to keep track of the mediation process and
to make effective use of outside support should that be appropriate.37
To summarize, the following criteria suggest a dispute is a good candidate
for mediation:
1. Essentially private dispute between parties of relatively equal power.
2. Basic applicable law is settled and can be adequately explained to
parties.
3. Internal affairs of relationship unsuited for system of act-oriented rules;
polycentric disputes involving complex, multi-faceted problems.
4. All necessary parties are included, willing to deal fairly with each other
and able to participate effectively in the process.
Conversely, the following items are negative indicators for mediation:
1. Dispute involves important unsettled questions of law affecting the
public interest; authoritative public adjudication needed.

32. If, however, the parties are business competitors in a highly concentrated market, private
settlement incurs the risk of antitrust liability, thus mediation is contraindicated. Conversely, it is also
advised against when the client cannot effectively represent one's own interests and will not be
represented by counsel during the mediation sessions. N. RoGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 55,
51-52.
33. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1371; Hazard & Scott, supra note 1, at 54-55.
34. J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrnTouT LAW? 136 (1986).
35. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1391.
36; Edwards, supra note 1, at 678-79; Hazard & Scott, supra note 1, at 56.
37. See generally Training Materials, supra note 4, at 21-22.
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Substantial differences in respective power, bargaining ability or
vulnerability to private negotiation pressure which cannot be corrected
through mediation process, supplemental information or independent
legal advice.
Consider, for example, the litigation in Brackenbury v. Hodgkin' as a
prime candidate for mediation. Mrs. Hodgkin, an aging widow, asked her
daughter and son-in law to move from Missouri to Maine so that they could care
for her and the family farm, closing the letter "you [shall] have the place when I
pass away." The family relationship badly deteriorated shortly after Mr. and Mrs.
Brackenbury arrived. Petty legal actions were instituted; mother deeded the
property to a sympathetic son, and the Brackenburys sued for breach of contract,
contending their entering into performance precluded revocation of the offer for
a unilateral contract. Contrary to prevailing unilateral contract doctrine allowing
for revocation anytime before completed performance,39 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine held the offer for a unilateral contract was accepted when the
offeree entered into performance of the specified acts. The opinion purported to
apply standard contract law; dicta suggests instead the decision was influenced by
a misogynist assessment that Mother was exceedingly difficult to deal with.
Accordingly, the court imposed a trust in favor of the Brackenburys. Mother
could not use the property to strike another bargain providing for her care. When
the litigation was done, Mother was effectively held captive in her own home, to
receive what care (and abuse) the Brackenburys saw fit to provide.4
Imagine, instead the case arose today. Now the law of unilateral contracts
has changed; section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second) provides that
part performance of an offer seeking acceptance only by performance results in
a binding option contract (precluding revocation), with the duty to perform
conditioned on full performance. Hopefully, most lawyers today would respond
to such an intrafamilial dispute by considering settlement first, with litigation as
a distant last choice. Effective counseling about the law and the emotional and
economic costs of litigation should encourage the parties to find a face-saving,
peaceful end to the situation. If private settlement efforts fail, mediation could
provide the optimal structure for venting anger, generating options, and eventually
finding a fair, equitable solution. This is the type of dispute where mediation may
best serve its primary functions. The parties are empowered to exercise autonomy,
choice and self-determination. Mediation evokes recognition, acknowledgement,
and some understanding or empathy for the other party's situation." I have used
the Brackenbury facts in contracts class for simulated exercises in counselling,
negotiation and mediation. Once the students realize they are free to settle on

38. 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917).
39. Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86, 161 N.E. 428 (1928).
40.

J.DAWSON,

W. HARVEY

& S.

HENDERSON, CoNTRACTs: CASES & COMMENT, MANUAL FOR

TEACHERS, 97 (5th Ed. 1987).

41. Bush, Efficiencyand Protection, orEmpowerment and Recognition: The Mediator's Role and
Ethical Standards inMediation, 41 U.FLA. L REv. 253, 268-69 (1989).
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terms different from the likely adjudicated outcome, they generate a wide range
of potential remedies. Mother may agree to compensate the Brackenburys for the
harm and costs of reliance on her promise. Brackenburys may realize that their
claim of full ownership to the family farm for a few months work is inequitable.
Sometimes the mediator has helped the parties identify specific problem areas in
the interpersonal relationship, to preserve both the contract and the family
relationship.
Brackenbury exemplifies a dispute well-suited for mediation. There is no
substantial power disparity. Mother has the desired economic resource; she has
the emotional and legal support of one or more of her other children. As Mother
dealing with her sole economic resource to obtain dignified care, her claim to
terminate the care-taking relationship has strong emotional appeal. Legally, facts
exist to support a claim of material breach, excusing any contract duty to perform.
Brackenburys have the power of relative youth and the equitable appeal of their
claim to compensation for their reliance. Current law limiting revocability of
offers further supports their bargaining position. Clearly, the internal affairs of an
intimate family relationship cannot be resolved by reference to external, actoriented legal rules. If both sides are represented by counsel more interested in
resolving the dispute than claiming a litigation victory, in mediation the parties
may reach an optimal negotiated result that far surpasses the rigid zero-sum
solution of adjudication. The process could also involve other family members
with competing claims to the property or alternative resources available for the
solution.
The very private nature of mediated solutions makes it more difficult to tell
a true story of a mediation that should instead have been litigated. A simulated
mediation presented at a dispute resolution workshop will need to suffice.42 A
male employee at a paint factory became sexually dysfunctional. Eventually, his
treating physician identified his job exposure as the probable cause; mixing
batches of paint exposed him to toxic chemicals. He filed a third party products
liability suit against the chemical supplier. Mediation was proposed to facilitate
stalled settlement talks. Many factual questions arose during the mediation. It
was uncertain whether the disorder was reversible or potentially life-threatening
to the plaintiff and others working in close proximity to the paint chemicals. Did
the chemical supplier or the employer have notice of an unreasonably dangerous
work condition, triggering a duty to warn or take other precautions? While the
products liability claim did not involve novel questions of law, substantial doubt
existed around application to these facts. The highly personal nature of the claim
reinforced standard power differences based on relative size and sophistication and
availability of economic resources to litigate aggressively. Understandably, the
worker was reluctant publicly to discuss the disorder. On the defense side,
damage control gave strong incentives to settle. Settlement would suppress
scientific evidence suggesting a causal relationship between the disorder and

42. American Association of Law Schools Miniworkshop on ADR in the Curriculum (Jan. 6,
1986).
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chemical exposure. Without causation, the chemical supplier would have no duty
to warn or prevent harm. Defense counsel and corporate officers privately
conceded their willingness to pay off this early claim, even at a premium, rather
than have public adjudication expose what might be the tip of an iceberg.
Many of us in the audience objected strongly that this case should not be
mediated. If the chemical exposure produced the harm, that information needed
to be disclosed to the public. Although the scientific evidence could be
challenged, it was substantial enough to warrant public review. Protection of the
public interest and absent third persons called for formal, authoritative determination. Depending on the court's view of the scientific evidence, it could trigger
other actions removing the chemical from the market, warnings on proper usage,
or further administrative inquiry to prevent widespread harm. Instead, a generous
mediated settlement might include a premium reflecting the added value of private
settlement at the expense of future claimants.
Undoubtedly, private negotiated settlements entail the same risk of selling
43
short the public interest in favor of a generous settlement to the plaintiff.
Mediation compounds the problem somewhat: the parties have been unable to
reach private settlement; presumably they are willing to proceed with public
adjudication. Mediation pushes them to further consider private settlement; the
usual process omits protection for unidentified absent third parties and the public
interest. In this type of private suit, participation by union health and safety
representatives could guard against the risk that plaintiff's silence will be bought
at the likely expense of others. Additionally, the presiding judge could be
assigned review authority to confirm that the private settlement (and likely
confidentiality provisions) will not subvert the public interest in workplace
safety."
The power imbalance is less troubling. As a practical matter, the superficial
differences in power and litigative capacity exist in most products liability actions.
These actions need not be generally disqualified from mediation. American
corporations are main supporters of developing alternatives to litigation, both
because of saved legal expenses and the corporate time that is better devoted to
productive activities. 5 If the legal principles and their application to a specific
product are reasonably well settled, and the plaintiff is represented by counsel in
the mediation, societal concerns for fair and efficient dispute resolution are
furthered.

43. Owen Fiss also voices this concern. See Fiss, supra note 1.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
45. See Lavelle, Congress Now ConsideringDispute Resolution Measure, N.LJ., Feb. 5, 1990 at
1; ADR: A Conversation, N.LJ., Feb. 27, 1989 at 51; Wilkinson, ADR Is IncreasinglyEffective, Averts
Litigation in Many Cases, N.LJ., Apr. 4, 1988 at 22.
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B. Mediator Accountability for Public Value of Fairness
Unless mediation practice departs from the absolute commitment to neutrality
it may coerce settlement seriously at odds with societal norms. 6 Where access
to court is short-circuited, the mediator is accountable for the quality of private
justice and its effect on public interests. Some intervention is required to protect
the public value of fairness.
Accountability does not conflict with that neutrality properly required of the
mediator. Absolute neutrality may be more theoretical than real. Current
literature departs from the traditional view, and refines its definition.4 7 Earlier
authorities often used "neutrality" to mean both that the mediator is unbiased and
uncommitted regarding outcome. 48 Some authorities now distinguish between
impartiality and neutrality. 49 A mediator is generally expected to be impartial as
to the parties, having no pre-existing loyalties that distort one's ability to facilitate
the process even-handedly. Many modern authorities do not consider strict

46. See generally J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrnioTU LAW?, supra note 34, at 135-36.
47. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 41. This thoughtful work evaluates the unique qualities of
mediation to better define the mediator's role and ethical obligations. Professor Bush identifies two
current conceptions: efficiency (facilitate agreements in as many cases as possible) and protection of
rights (ensure neither party's rights are compromised by settlement process). Both conceptions, he
argues, are fundamentally flawed. A sounder conception of the mediator's role is based "on what
mediation can do that other processes cannot." The empowerment function relates to the capacity of
mediation to encourage parties to exercise autonomy, choice and self-determination. Drawing on
Professor Fuller's earlier work, the recognition function can produce understanding and empathy of
common humanity, even in the face of bitter conflict. Id. at 258-273.
Fulfiling the empowerment role requires the mediator to ensure that the parties act
Therefore, the
with full information and understanding in making their decisions ....
mediator should push for the parties to disclose and otherwise marshall all information to
resolving the dispute.., the mediator should push for the parties to fully comprehend all
the information before them, including the range of issues presented and each party's
positions. Therefore, the mediator should summarize, clarify, question, and test for
comprehension before allowingdecisionmaking to proceed.
Id at 278.
The parties should understand fully the consequences of either reaching or failing to reach
settlement. Empowerment also relates to the mediator's obligation to provide information on the law
and legal advice. While the law need not control the parties' decision, information about the law "as
an indication of what is obtainable from the legal marketplace, . . . as an indication of societal
standards, . . [or] as an expression of underlying principles ... which the parties might want to
consider in approaching their own resolution." Id. at 280, citing Training Materials, supra note 4.
I agree with Professor Bush to a large extent. Without adequate factual and legal information,
mediation participants lack genuine capacity to assent. By providing such information, the parties are
given the choice to approximate the likely result of adjudication, or to find a particular solution that
works better for them. My point, arguing for checking mechanisms to protect public values, formalizes
the mediator's accountability to the public legal system where the private settlement of a legally-based
dispute supplants public adjudication.
48. See references in N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 139.
49. See generally sources cited infra notes 50-58.
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neutrality as to outcome possible or essential."0 The mediator "should be
concerned with fairness ... [and] has an obligation to avoid an unreasonable
result." 51
Accountability relates tothe ethical, moral and legal obligations imposed on
mediators who facilitate disputes that would otherwise be resolved in court.
Accountability and impartiality are consistent. Enhanced responsibility for
procedural and substantive fairness is essential to protect public values at risk from
private settlement. Ethical standards should guide the mediator on discharging this
responsibility in the diverse law-related mediation contexts.52 Public review of
settlements plus risk of malpractice liability should act as safety nets protecting
individual and public concerns for fairness.
Accepted mediation techniques reflect minimal accountability to use
53
procedures adapted to prevent unfairness.
Ethics codes urge the mediator to
54
behavior.
stop intimidating or abusive
Mediation is a facilitative process, directed towards creating a context for
pursuing the parties' mutual sense of fairness. 5 The usual process of generating
and evaluating options takes account of how the law might view a dispute as a

50. Honeyman, Bias and Mediators'Ethics, 1986 NEGoTIATioN J. 175, 176 (obligation to disclose
personal and situational biases). But see Smith, Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator, 1985
NEGoTIATiON J.363, suggesting that at least in the context of international mediation, mediator
bias-in the sense of having some national alignment and predisposition is common, and does not
impair the process. See also Susskind and Ozawa, MediatedNegotiation in the Public Sector, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIST 255-79 (1983) (traditional mediator has a clear limit on what would be
considered a reasonable settlement in keeping with community standards of justice.)
51. ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) Standard III
D,
reprintedin 17 FAM. LQ. 451. See also Center for Dispute Resolution Code of Professional Conduct
for Mediators (Denver, Colo.) [hereinafter Code of Conduct], reprinted in DIsPurE RESOLuTION, supra
note 6, at 116-22.
52. See, e.g., ABA Standards of Practice for Divorce Mediators, reprinted in 17 FAm. L.Q. 451
(1984), stating an "obligation to avoid an unreasonable result." IV.C. To that end, guidance calls for
procedural intervention, assuring participants have sufficient information and knowledge on which to
make their decisions, advising them to obtain independent legal review before making agreement, and
diffusing manipulative or intimidating negotiation techniques. Limited intervention on the substantive
terms is authorized: a mediator shall not direct the negotiations based on one's interpretation of the
law and predicted application to the facts; if the agreement being approached is unreasonable, the
mediator must suspend or terminate the process. V.B.
The ABA Standards carefully preserve the role of independent counsel; in so doing, an
unrepresented mediation participant gets minimal protection against a patently unfair result. This is
satisfactory only if interpreted to present risk of later accountability to a mediator who finalizes a
dubious agreement without both parties obtaining independent legal advice. If the agreement is
patently unfair when judged against prevailing legal norms and nothing indicates it resulted from
unique party preferences, public review should allow rescission. Should such relief be unavailable, the
harmed participant should have malpractice recourse against the mediator.
53. N. ROGERs & R. SALEM, supra note 2, at 146, n. 31.
54. Id. at 146.
55. Training Materials, supra note 4, at 41. See generally Hobbs, FacilitativeEthics in Divorce
Mediation: A Law and Process Approach, 22 U. RIcHMoND L REv. 325, 363 (key principle of
divorce mediation is to "facilitate the fulfillment of the client's moral and legal family obligation.").
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relevant reference point from which to evaluate options according to the parties'
mutual sense of fairness, and recognizing where the law reflects societal norms
and underlying values.56 Selection among alternatives eliminates unworkable
options, including those at odds with one party's sense of fairness.57 As options
are generated and discarded, discussion may focus on understanding the other's
perspective, "to experience the other's reality."" A grossly unfair agreement is
at risk of non-compliance by the disadvantaged party. Upon realizing its
unfairness the burdened party may refuse to perform, and take one's chances with
the formal legal system. Thus, a successful mediation consistently focuses on
questions of fairness as perceived by the participants, with reference to the
applicable law.
Law plays at least a supporting role in any law-related dispute. 9 It provides
a basis to inform and test the subjective fairness of an agreement as viewed by the
parties." Participants need enough information about the law so they can bargain
within the legal framework, or choose against following legal norms in preference
to creating their own norms.61 When parties are adequately informed of the
approximate legal outcome and voluntarily agree to deviate from that standard
because of their personal preferences and values, the finalized agreement should
include a provision that it was entered voluntarily, with adequate information, and
reflects personal preferences which improve upon the predicted legal outcome.
The mediator should know enough about the law to assess whether an
agreement is within the range of legally acceptable outcomes. If it is not, the
parties should be told of this assessment and the potential problems when the
agreement is publicly reviewed.62 Later review thus gives participants added
incentive to find common ground within legal limits of fairness. Whenever a
mediation would affect important legal rights, the parties should be advised to
obtain outside
review by independent counsel to review and help process the final
63
agreement.

56. Training Materials, supra note 4.
57. See, e.g., CooleyArbitrationvs. Mediation-Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263,

269 (1986), Honeyman, Five Elements of Mediation, 1988 NEG.OrIATION J. 149.
58. Training Materials, supra note 4, at 44.
59. Riskin, Toward New Standards For the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L REv. 329,

335-36 (1984) [hereafter Riskin, NeutralLawyer].
60. l& at 337.
61. Id. at 336.
62. See Training Materials, supra note 4, at 25. Mediator will not generally offer opinion as to
what is fair, subject to three exceptions: (1) if one party takes advantage of other; (2) the parties are

moving towards agreement that mediator believes is so unfair that it would be a 'severe miscarriage
of justice; (3) a court would not accept the agreement.
63. See, e.g., ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Divorce Disputes, supra

note 51, criticized for overly protecting independent counsel's role in Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra
note 59, at 349.
See also Training Materials, supra note 4. In these materials, Gary Friedman includes lawyer
review as part of the initial contract between the mediator and parties. He makes clear the parties
should view the lawyers reviewing the agreement (as well as other technical experts such as
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Review by independent counsel also begins to bring the private resolution
back into the public domain. This lawyer protects public concern for the quality
of individualized justice by advising the client-participant against an unfair
agreement, helping with further negotiations, or pursuing litigation.'
If a proposed agreement is outside the range of acceptable outcomes, further
intervention is warranted. A mediator may not finalize an agreement believed to
be illegal, grossly inequitable, or based on false information. The parties must be
told of the problem, and efforts redirected towards generating new, acceptable
options, or the mediation should terminate. Mediator withdrawal remains the
ultimate weapon to prevent an unfair agreement.65
Extent of mediator accountability for fairness varies by whether the mediator
is a lawyer, and whether the parties are independently represented by counsel.
1. The Lawyer-Mediator
A lawyer-mediator practices law in the sense of using legal knowledge to
solve problems." Legal knowledge facilitates the mediation. Where a dispute
is legally related, the lawyer-mediator cannot divorce legal knowledge from the
mediation process. The lawyer-mediator cannot avoid the higher accountability
to approximate or improve upon the likely result of litigation simply by concealing
one's status as a lawyer. Mediation skills are acquired and that career route
pursued because deficiencies in the legal system create the professional opportunity.

accountants) as consultants, not as "' professionals' who take over what the parties should be doing, or
who inject their views of how the parties should be looking at their lives." Training Materials, supra
note 4, at 19, 25.
If an agreement appears imbalanced, based on the probable adjudicated outcome, but is an
acceptable outcome in terms of mediator accountability, external review is strongly advisable to guard
against later challenges. One party may be willing to pay the other's cost of obtaining independent
review in order to conclude settlement. Legal fees can be paid by a non-client with client consent
provided there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship and confidential information is protected. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

64. See, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 24, at 27-29, recounting divorce mediation where wife frequently
advised to consult with her lawyer. Lawyer strongly objected to her mediated settlement. Wife
terminated relationship with lawyer and presented agreement to court pro se. Nevertheless, lawyer
appeared in court and objected to settlement. Judge spoke with wife at length before accepting the
agreement. Lawyer's outspoken objections clearly put wife on notice that she was trading off more
favorable financial settlement to avoid damaged relationship with her children. Judge's participation
served as check to insure agreement subverted no important public values.
65. See, e.g., Code of Conduct, supra note 51, at 116-22.
66. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmmY EC 3-5 (1980) relating a general body
and philosophy of law to the client's specific legal problem. See also Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra
note 59, at 335, n. 20; Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer: Implicationsfor the Practiceof Law and One
Argument for ProfessionalResponsibility Guidance-A Proposalfor Some Ethical Considerations,34
UCLA L REv. 507, 521 (1986) [hereafter cited as Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer].
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Where the parties are not independently represented, the lawyer-mediator
jointly represents them in a limited capacity. 67 Conflicts questions presently
aside, the "neutral lawyer" is engaged in the practice of law. When mediating a
litigable dispute, the neutral lawyer is accountable both to the legal system and the
clients. Discipline and malpractice liability should provide downside risks for
failing to satisfy the obligation. Where the mediation substitutes for legal process,
the neutral lawyer has a duty to protect the public value of fairness.
A neutral lawyer mediates disputes where separate lawyers for the parties are
non-existent or play a limited role.s Whether law is the foundation for decisionmaking or plays a supporting role to their own sense of fairness, 69 the mediator
should ensure the parties have sufficient information to make informed decisions
on whether to settle privately or proceed to court. Unless they understand their
respective legal positions and what might happen in court, they cannot make
informed decisions about whether agreement is a satisfactory alternative. Lacking
such information, the parties cannot test a proposed agreement against their own
sense of fairness-key to successful mediation.
Substantial questions exist about the applicability of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to lawyer-mediators. The substantive provisions of Rule
2.2 Intermediary superficially fit the mediation process.70 A non-binding
comment, however, states "[tihe Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as
arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the
lawyer."7 ' Other ethics codes, such as those for Arbitration in Commercial
Disputes, may apply instead.72 A technical distinction can be made between the
lawyer who serves as an intermediary to resolve a problem between two clients
and a mediator hired to facilitate negotiation in a non-representational capacity.
Mediation scholars debate whether Rule 2.2 applies. Professor Riskin
opposes using Rule 2.2 for mediation because the concept of "representation"
envisions a duty of undivided loyalty inconsistent with a neutral posture toward
all parties.73 Professors Rogers and McEwen take seriously the disclaimer
comment, and so mention Rule 2.2 only in passing; applying instead Rule 1.7, the
general conflicts provision.74 One student commentator argues the rule applies,

67. See generally Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59.
68. Id. at 332.
69. Id. at 357.
70. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
71. MODEL RULES, supra note 63, Rule 2.2 comment. Only the blackletter text of the rules is
authoritative; comments are guides to interpretation. Id.
72. Id.
73. Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59, at 341-42.
74. N. ROGERS & C. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, Poucy, PRACTICE § 9.2 (1989). See also G.
HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 309-10 (1985). This leading reference on the rules makes no comment on

the mediation disclaimer, and its treatment could support either view, that Rule 2.2 applies or does not
apply to mediation. In "mediation" the lawyer represents all parties, as contrasted with "the typical
arbitration in which a lawyer serves as a neutral third party, but 'represents' nobody." Id. at 309-10.
The intermediary represents clients who, "though technically adverse, share a more compelling interest
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but needs further revisions to accommodate the mediation process.75 Another
notes that Rule 2.2 completely excludes "nonrepresentational" mediation, and
proposes a new rule designed for divorce mediation to fill the gap.76 Two state
ethics opinions apply Rule 2.2, either directly" or indirectly. 78 By contrast to
the numerous ethics opinions on mediation under the Code, surprisingly few arise
under the Model Rules. One could speculate that Rule 2.2 states the general
principles well enough that state ethics administrators assume it applies to
mediation without getting into the precise questions generating academic debate.79
As written, Rule 2.2 contemplates a more expansive representation than that
of the usual mediation. It assumes prior representation of both clients before
undertaking to act as an intermediary. In that context, it properly holds the lawyer
to high standards of evaluating the suitability of joint representation and protecting
each party's legitimate interests. Intermediation between clients is proper where
a reasonable lawyer would find agreement is feasible, the clients are adequately
informed of the potential risks, and they consent to the common representation.'
Before undertaking mediation the lawyer must reasonably determine the matter can
be resolved "on terms compatible with the clients' best interests,... each client
will be able to make adequately informed decisions ...

and ... there is little risk

of material prejudice" to either client's interests if the mediation fails.8 '

One

in reaching agreement as a group." Id. Cf Fuller, supra note 18, at 334-36. "Intermediary" and
"intermediation" are used interchangeably with "mediator" and "mediation." To illustrate a proper
application of Rule 2.2(a), Hazard and Hodes describe a lawyer's joint representation of husband and
wife to process an amicable divorce in which the lawyer may suggest changes where the proposed
agreement unduly favors one party, They cite recognized works on the mediation process as
supplementary authorities on the lawyer as intermediary. G. HAZARD & W. HODES at 314-36; see also
Riskin, supra note 59; Silberman, ProfessionalResponsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16
FAM. LQ. 107 (1982), Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1982).
75. Comment, The Mediator Lawyer, supra note 66.
76. Comment, Model Rule 2.2 and Divorce Mediation: Ethics Guidelines, or Ethics Gap? 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 223 (1987) (Comment by Wendy Woods).
77. Kentucky Bar Advisory Op. E-335, 53 Ky. Bench & Bar, Summer 1989, at 47.
78. Florida Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Advisory Op. 86-88 (1986), discussed in Hobbs,
supra note 55 (Rule 2.2 guidelines "instructive;" apply by analogy).
79. For example, when questioned about mediation, the Wisconsin ethics hot line refers callers
to Rule 2.2. Telephone interview with Keith Kapp, Ethics Consultant, State Bar of Wisconsin, October
16, 1990).
80. See also MODEL RutEs, supranote 63, Rule 1.2(c), allowing a limited scope of representation.
81. Id., Rule 2.2(aX2). If Rule 2.2 were to apply to the usual mediation context, substantial
-comment revisions are warranted. Besides clarifying the coverage issue, another comment overly
restricts when mediation is allowed. A lawyer cannot undertake mediation if contentious litigation is
imminent, or contentious negotiations are contemplated. If literally applied, this comment would
eliminate mediation by a trained lawyer in many situations where it is most valuable. The legitimate
conflict of interest question concerns whether the limited joint representation can adequately protect
both clients' interests. Successful mediation allows venting of hostility so the parties can generate
viable options addressing the underlying concerns. Initial contentiousness should not preclude
representation unless the lawyer should reasonably doubt mediation will succeed. The comment
furthers the adversarial presupposition from the Code. See Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer, supra
note 66, at 516-17; Riskin, NeutralLawyer, supra note 59, at 349-52.
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must seriously assess the propriety of joint representation before seeking client
consent. The lawyer must find impartiality is correct for the situation and will not
affect any other responsibilities owed either client.82 Only after consulting with
each client on the implications of mediation-risks, advantages and effect on
privilege-may the lawyer obtain consent to the joint representation. 3 During
intermediation, the lawyer must consult with each client, providing information
about factual, legal and equitable considerations to enable adequately informed
decisions." The lawyer must withdraw if either client requests, or upon failure
of any condition for the joint representation.8 5 After withdrawing, the lawyer
may not represent either party concerning the dispute.'
These basic principles similarly apply to the context where individuals seek
the aid of a professional mediator for the sole purpose of helping them resolve
their dispute. However, where the lawyer-mediator has no prior professional
relationship with either party, Rule 2.2 may impose unreasonably high standards
that will hamper lawyer participation. Given the very limited professional
undertaking, the lawyer-mediator probably lacks sufficient information to
determine the "matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best
interests, .. . and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interest...
[of either] if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful." ' Ethical concerns
cause many lawyer-mediators to avoid private caucuses with either party, and a
participant is unlikely to share publicly private information relating to whether
resolution is in one's best interests. Nor can the mediator be sure that the
attempted mediation presents no material risks or prejudice. "Agreements not to
during a mediation
disclose, subpoena, or offer in evidence information conveyed
'a
...do not fully protect those data from disclosure."
Court-annexed mediation presents unique problems in complying with Rule
2.2: the lawyer-mediator may not be free to simply withdraw if either party
requests. The halted mediation may, in the eyes of the court, materially prejudice
the party refusing to continue. Moreover, full conflicts screening may be
impossible in many court-annexed or community mediation programs where
lawyers volunteer, and are assigned specific disputes with identified parties only
at the appointed time for the mediation. Instead, a limited conflicts screening
should suffice. If, to the best of the lawyer's and parties' knowledge, neither the
lawyer, nor the lawyer's firm has previously represented either party, the volunteer
mediator should be allowed to proceed. It is unrealistic to charge the volunteer
lawyers and their firms with the full implications of a "representation" including

82. MODEL RULES, supra note 63, Rule 2.2(aX3).
83. Id., Rule 2.2(aXl).
84. See generally Maute, Allocation of DecisionmakingAuthority Under the Model Rules of

ProfessionalConduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 1049 (1984).
85. MODEL RULES, supra note 63, Rule 2.2(c).

86. Applied to mediation of conflicts, continued representation of either client after mediation fails
violates the lawyer's continuing duties to a former client. See MODEL RULES, supra note 63, Rule 1.9.
87. Id., Rule 2.2(aX2).
88: ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 74, at § 8.23.
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the far-ranging effect on imputed disqualification. Given that the entire mediation
may take an hour, the only question of imputed disqualification should relate to
successive representations on substantially related matters. The full consultation
envisioned by Rule 2.2(a)(1) and (b) may not be feasible or warranted. As an
alternative, the mediation program should provide a written brochure that simply
and clearly explains the process, its advantages and risks. Before beginning the
session, the volunteer mediator can confirm the parties have read and understood
the brochure, and providb further explanations if needed.
Basically, those entities responsible for regulating the legal profession have
three choices. First, they can adapt Rule 2.2 to better fit the usual mediation
context; this runs the risk of diluting the protection given to clients in the context
originally intended. Second, they can construct in ethics opinions guidelines for
mediation, starting with other provisions of the Model Rules, but drawing on Rule
2.2. This has the advantage of flexibility, to address new situations and problems
as they arise. Third, they can adopt a new rule designed only for limited
representation by the neutral lawyer in mediation. I think the latter is the wisest
alternative, and undertake to draft a proposed rule in another article.8 9 This
avoids stretching Rule 2.2 beyond its intended application. Rule 1.7, the general
conflicts provision, provides a sound starting place. Many of the principles
underlying Rule 2.2 may apply to regulate the permissible scope of a limited
representation in mediation.
Although further guidance is needed, the Model Rules should apply to
regulate neutral lawyering as a limited joint representation. As developed above,
the lawyer-mediator is practicing law, and in the typical mediation receives a fee
for services. Lawyers' ethical rules should therefore regulate one's behavior, in
addition to other mediation-specific ethical rules. Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer
contractually to limit the scope of representation if done so at the outset. Rule 1.7
permits limited representation of multiple clients with conflicts if consent is given
after adequate disclosure.
Ethics opinions split on whether mediation is "representation" triggering
conflicts of interest problems." Under the strict but unworkable Code conflicts
provisions, avoiding the representation label was the pragmatic way to allow
mediation. It did not, however, accurately assess the lawyer's undertaking.
Properly interpreted, the Model Rules avoid the need for this facade. They
explicitly allow limited representation assumed with consent after adequate
disclosure. 9'
Under case law the client-lawyer relationship is easily assumed, without need
of formal retainer. 92 A neutral lawyer who mediates represents both clients in

89. See Maute, Public Values and PrivateJustice: A Case for MediatorAccountability, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETncs - (forthcoming) (1990-91).
90. See generally Silberman, supra note 74; Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59, at 337-46.
91. MODEL RuLES, supra note 63, Rule 1.2(c).
92. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
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a limited capacity.93 Whether that is proper requires closer examination of the
dispute and a determination of whether the lawyer reasonably expects the parties
can reach a fair settlement through mediation. Part 2 of the Model Rules
addresses the lawyer's role as Counselor, as distinguished from Advocate. The
lawyer-mediator must clarify one's non-partisan role. The neutral lawyer provides
legal information in a non-adversarial fashion to help the parties understand their
legal positions and uncertainties."
Specific guidelines should define the mediator's accountability for public
values of fairness to the parties, absent persons, and the legal system.9" Professor
Riskin argues the neutral lawyer is bound to help the parties reach an agreement
that does not violate minimal standards of societal notions of fairness. 96 This is
a good start for increased mediator accountability. However, it does not state a
meaningful standard for potential discipline, civil liability, or court review. I
propose instead a standard that the agreement approximate or improve upon the
probable outcome of litigation. This incorporates the relevant substantive law,
difficulties of proof, and acknowledges the personal preferences resulting in a
maximal private settlement at odds with probable legal outcome. By undertaking
to mediate a dispute capable of legal resolution when the parties are not
independently represented, the lawyer mediator assumes responsibility to tell the
parties enough about the applicable law and its uncertainties so their settlement
decision is adequately informed. The proposed standard is satisfied if the parties
knowingly and voluntarily agree to deviate from the probable litigated outcome
and the agreemeni embodies their personal preferences.
Suppose, for example, a divorce mediation in which the husband is willing
to give the wife a generous settlement so that he can quickly remarry, and
alleviate guilt feelings associated with the dissolution. Where the mediator
accurately explains the applicable law and its probable application to their
situation, the agreement should recite this fact, briefly allude to the personal
preferences attributable to the variance from the probable legal outcome, and that
the agreement is voluntarily entered to reflect these personal preferences.
Where parties are independently advised, the mediator is accountable for
assuring a fair process, free of abusive behavior that coerces settlement favoring
the stronger party. A lower standard of accountability is warranted where the
parties retain a mediator to facilitate negotiation, and do not expect legal
information. Here there is no representation; liability should ensue only for failing

93. Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Op. No. 488 (1983) approves of limited representation in the
mediation context, as does Professor Riskin.
94. Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59, at 335-36.
95. See generally Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer, supra note 66.
96. Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59, at 354.
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to ensure the process is fair. This should apply whether or not the mediator is a
lawyer.97
2. The Non-Lawyer Mediator
For non-lawyer mediators, accountability raises delicate unauthorized practice
issues. It is hard to assess unauthorized practice restrictions because genuine
concern for the public is mixed with lawyers' collective economic concerns.98
Most mediators are laypersons; many serve as volunteers. A large portion
come from mental health, social work and other disciplines. Unlike most lawyers,
these mediation professionals are trained in interpersonal skills and are better
equipped to mediate problems in relationships. Dispute resolution professionals
are now a distinct professional category, with resulting pressure to expand and
solidify their position. When moving into areas traditionally handled by lawyers,
mediation poses an economic threat to the legal profession. Antitrust questions
discourage the bar from taking positions unjustified by the public interest. 99
Unauthorized practice inquiries should properly focus on whether consumers are
harmed when a non-lawyer performs services that a lawyer might do.
Private mediation of legal disputes outside litigation can affect important
legal rights. A party cannot evaluate the fairness of an option without minimally
adequate information about the law. Mediation that does not assure each party has
such information is likely to reinforce existing disparities in knowledge, resources
and power. Unauthorized practice rules prohibit non-lawyers from giving legal
advice and drafting legal documents. There is the dilemma. Mediation process
must accommodate the parties' need for information with the mediator's limited
ability to give complete and accurate information. Restrictions against a lawyer's
assisting another's unauthorized practice should be narrowly construed. Better
informed parties are more likely to reach optimal, reasonably fair agreements.

97. This standard is similar to that proposed in Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties
and Liabilities of American Mediators, 1986 HARv. L REv. 1876, 1886-94. The mediator has a
general duty of procedural openness, "to ensure that neither disputant was allowed to abuse the
contractarian process." A material breach entitles the injured party to seek rescission and restitution
from the other party, but not necessarily damages from the mediator. Equitable and policy
considerations of proximate cause should limit mediator liability to those cases where breach caused
detrimental reliance or consequential harm apart from ill-formed contracts, or where identifiable third
persons with substantial interests in the dispute were excluded from negotiations.
The standard I propose applies only to law-related mediations where the parties have some
independent counsel. Disputing parties are entitled to higher protection where the lawyer-mediator
assumes a limited joint representation. Recourse available under this standard may overlap with that
available on public review of the settlement.
98. See generally Silberman, supra note 74.
99. Antitrust concerns lurk behind other areas of lawyer regulation. See Maute, Scrutinizing
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13
HASTINGS CONSTITUTONAL LQ. 487 (1986). Recent constitutional challenges to the integrated bar
could risk loss of the state action exemption to antitrust law. See Keller v. California State Bar,
U.S....
110 S.Ct. 2228 (1990).
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Lawyers should be encouraged to prepare brochures, video-tapes, or act as legal
advisors to mediation teams without risking discipline for aiding in the unauthorized practice of law. Such involvement outside the context of representation
better responds to parties' needs for accurate legal information."0
Where private agreement occurs instead of adjudication, public fairness
values require safeguards. The amount of legal information needed for sound
decisions varies with the kind of dispute. Essentially private disputes bearing little
relation to law are not the concern. The need for legal information increases with
proximity to law. For routine, low stakes consumer cases and other common
problems unlikely to be litigated, brochures can suffice. Private mediation
programs can distribute brochures prepared by lawyers which state the legal
principles relevant to these disputes.
By contrast, divorce mediation requires the parties have more precise legal
information, including normal terms of separation, support, child visitation and
taxes.1 ° ' Public concerns warrant greater lawyer involvement, whether as part
of a mediation team 102 or as independent counsel to review proposed agreements, 3 Besides the safeguards described above, official supervision and
review of agreements should confirm that they satisfy minimal standards of
societal fairness.1°4
C. Public Review of PrivateJustice
When mediation supplants adjudication of private disputes 5 limited public
review should confirm the agreement is within legal bounds and does not subvert
an important public value. The benchmark for evaluating fairness is whether the
agreement approximates or improves upon the probable adjudicated outcome."°
The reviewing body should set aside mediated agreements failing to satisfy
minimal societal fairness. Where a dispute is litigable and the law reasonably
settled, this standard can protect the quality of justice in mediation. Limited court
review acts as a safety net in the last instance, rejecting patently unfair agreements. Review should occur promptly, before the parties detrimentally rely on the

100. See generally ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 74, at § 9.5.
101. Boston Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Op. 78-1 (1979), cited in Oregon Legal Ethics Op. No. 488
(1983).
102. Oregon Legal Ethics Op. No. 488 (1983).
103. Professor Riskin criticizes the ABA Family Mediation Guidelines for placing too much
emphasis on independent, partisan representation. This can impede neutral lawyering. Riskin, Neutral
Lawyer, supra note 59, at 350-52.
104. Edwards, AlternativeDispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema ?, supra note 1, at 671-72;
Riskin, Neutral Lawyer, supra note 59, at 353-58.
105. That is, the dispute is otherwise suited for public adjudication in that the relationship is
properly determined under a system of act-oriented rules. See generally Edwards, supra note 1, at 671;
Hazard & Scott, supra note 1; Fuller, supra note 18.
106. Hazard & Scott, supra note 1, at 56.
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agreement. It may be summary, confirming the agreement is knowing, voluntary
and not in gross derogation of law and equity.
Public review of mediated agreements is critical for disputes between
unequals that might otherwise go to court. I am sympathetic to the values of
autonomy, mutual understanding and respect. Without some supervision and
review, there is little confidence that mediation will protect public values of
fairness and need for authoritative resolution. Especially for court-referred
mediation, participation is not wholly voluntary. The threat of public enforcement
gives court-annexed mediation coercive power to achieve agreement despite lack
of voluntary consent by the weaker party. Mediation involving juvenile offenders,
crime victims and offenders, landlords and tenants, and divorcing spouses is often
annexed to the formal legal system. Agreement may finally determine the parties'
respective obligations, avoiding formal adjudication. Absent prompt and limited
review, the risks of private settlement are too great to warrant public sanction. The
extent of review may vary, depending on the amount of risk to public values.
Summary review may be warranted for some tort claims, while the more public
aspects of prison complaints, consumer, and employment disputes warrant more
exacting review. 107
IV. CONCLUSION
At its best, mediation offers hope for resolving many kinds of disputes
without the lingering hostility of litigation. It respects autonomous choice-making
and party participation better than the formal adversary system. At its worst,
mediation ends disputes to the detriment of the uninformed, powerless, or
ineffective bargainer. Mediation is not a cure-all properly used for any dispute.
Some of my criticisms and suggested reforms may be radical. If accepted, they
undoubtedly would change some forms of mediation and the judicial system's
supervisory role. I do not want to undermine the growth of mediation programs,
but merely to encourage carefully developed procedures for mediating law-related
disputes. Absent minimal accountability for fairness, private mediation risks
second class justice.

107. Assuming those cases do not present unsettled questions of public law or importance, and
one properly addressed in mediation. See supra text accompanying notes 18-45.
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